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Introduction 
International law, past and present has had to constantly wrestle 
with striking a balancing act between legality and imperialism. 
Following the Agrarian and Industrial revolutions, European1 
economies increasingly witnessed profound boosts in productivity and 
net output beginning from the 17th century. By the start of the 19th 
century when explorations and discoveries were the currency of the day, 
European powers increasingly saw the acquisition of Africa as crucial to 
satisfy its economic imperatives namely: reinforcing home industries 
and instituting a market for finished products. While professing liberal 
moralism, European encroachment into Africa became suddenly 
exemplified with a turn from informal to formal empire.2 As Europeans 
penetrated deep into Africa, there also arose a need to develop a body of 
rules to govern their relations. The eventual encounter with African 
indigenous peoples3 sparked many complications for international 
lawyers at the level of international relations. How was international 
                                                     
∗  Doctoral Candidate in International Law, Department of Public Law, University of 
Helsinki. Author can be contacted at:  amin.forji@helsinki.fi or 
amingeorges@yahoo.co.uk 
1  The term “Europe” in this work except where specified otherwise will be limited to 
the great European powers that colonized Africa. While I do recognize that 
colonialism and imperialism are not always one and the same, in this work I would 
nevertheless exceptionally used them interchangeably. Imperialism for the purpose 
of this work denotes to the domination and imposition of one’s own legal and 
economic systems on other polities. See E. Jouannet, Universalism and Imperialism: 
The True-False Paradox of International Law?, 18 The European Journal of International 
Law, (2007), 382. 
2  B. Azikiwe, Ethics of Colonial Imperialism, 16 The Journal of Negro History, (1931), 
287; M. Koskenniemi, “The Legacy of the 19th Century,” (2007), 
http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/MKLEGACY%20OF%20T
HE%2019TH%20CENTURY-07e.pdf.  
3    I will also used such terms as “native”,  “other”, “primitive”, “uncivilized”, 
“backward”, “savage”, “Indigenous”, “barbarian”, etc (without necessarily having  
them in quotes) mainly to highlight  their  historical usage. 
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law going to qualify the colonization of the African continent by 
European invaders? Where was the moral boundary of subjugation in 
relation to international law? What standard was this moral boundary 
going to be based on?  
With the inauguration of Revue de Droit International et de Iegislation 
Compare in 1868 as the first ever professional International Law journal, 
the discipline instantly assumed a new professional self-awareness 
especially in advocating for liberal reforms.4 The Belgian jurist, Gustave 
Rolin-Jacquemyns in its inaugural manifesto propounded l’esprit 
d’internationalité, which recognized common universal principles and the 
superior unity of the great human society.5 This invocation paved the 
way for internationalist thinking and doctrine, which as I will illustrate 
later cemented the groundwork for European colonization, based on the 
idea of a duty to civilize and enlighten the “dark” continent of Africa. 
 This work will examine the historical analysis of the relationship 
between the European encounter with Africa and the civilizing mission 
narrative, with highlights on the logic of economic development as the 
driving force of the project. In fact, international law has not just been at 
the epicenter but deeply intertwined with the development project. With 
the 19th century as my starting point, I will draw on the legal mindset of 
the era (positivism) as well as contemporary scholarships to illustrate 
the constant contradictory tendencies of promise (economic 
development) and peril (exploitation) by international law and how the 
framing of development initiatives for Africa by the discipline has come 
with a lot of baggage. What has been the impact of positivism on Africa 
with respect to economic development? The invocation of development 
whether implicitly or expressly has often been all encompassing. My 
contention is that international law and economic development must be 
seen in their true character—not only are they related, they are 
inseparable and function within common parameters. 
 International law is without doubt a product of European genius.6 It 
has functioned as an indispensible tool to spread European values to the 
rest of the world while at the same time affirming a universal tone. 
However, as some scholars have rightly observed, international law is 
not an abstract entity nor does it function in a vacuum. It has its roots in 
                                                     
4  M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 
1870-1960, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001, 14-15. 
5  Ibid., 13. 
6  Jouannet, supra, note 1, 383. 
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human nature itself.7 Thus what is “international” is often the voice of a 
particular speaking as universal. The voice of the civilized has the trend 
of serving as a universal standard. Nineteenth century legal doctrine 
placed much emphasis on economic development framed in terms of 
material and moral progress for the “backward” “uncivilized” non-
Europeans, which was then used as the basis to legitimize European 
colonization in Africa and elsewhere around the globe.  
 For the sake of specificity, I would mostly restrict my arguments to 
the operation of the mission on the African continent (Sub-Saharan 
Africa). Some of the questions which I would attempt to address include 
how international law defined Africa in the 19th century and how that 
vocabulary is relevant today. What is the connection between 
international law and colonization, especially what are the legal results 
of using the standard of civilization as the trendsetter of international 
law and consequently development? Moreover, in what ways did (has) 
this vocabulary as a “standard” buttressed the subordination and 
exploitation of Africa by the West and international institutions in the 
name of development?8 While there has recently been some excellent 
scholarship on the colonial history of international law,9 most of it has 
centered on the cultural differentiation arguments vindicating the 
civilizing mission. This work will try to examine the economic 
component of the project with special focus on the operation of the 
development narrative in Africa.  
 
1.   Background: Encounter, Development Metaphor and the 
Framing of the “Other” 
 Understanding the history of the colonial encounter between Europe 
and Africa is crucial in grasping why the logic of development whether 
                                                     
7  H. Bonfils & P. Fauchille, Manuel de Droit International Public (Droit des Gens), 
Rousseau, Paris 19054, 4. 
8  J. Moses, “Humanitarianism and International Law: The Standard of Civilization in 
Contemporary International Relations,” Paper presented at the International Studies 
Association Annual Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1-5 March 2005, 3; P. Singh, From 
Narcissistic Positive International Law to Universal Natural International Law: The 
Dialectics of Absentee Colonialism, 16  African Journal of International & Comparative 
Law, (2008), 73, 74, & 77. 
9  For example, G.W. Gong, The Standard of Civilization in International Society 
Clarendon Press,  Oxford 1984; Koskenniemi, supra, note 4; David Kennedy, 
‘International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion’ 17 Quinnipiac 
Law Review (1997) 99-138. 
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expressly or impliedly was at the epicenter of the civilizing mission. 
Colonialism has in fact been qualified as Europe’s first gift of science to 
the rest of the world.10 In the 19th century, Africa without doubt 
presented itself as a perfect laboratory for such an experiment. European 
intellectuals were quick to adopt an unqualified premise that Africa had 
no history of its own, and even if there was any, it was either redundant, 
of little relevance to the modern world or nothing to take home—a 
strong supposition that nothing happened there in its “prehistory.”11 
Beside oral testimonies, historical accounts of life in Africa before the 
arrival of the Europeans were at best scanty. It is alleged that historians 
were arguably not greatly interested. Those who expressed concern 
more often than not perpetuated the sense that the history of Africa was 
the history of white activity there.12 African customs and traditions were 
nothing more than a mere curiosity. It is the European actions that were 
of importance and relevance.13 
Tales of explorers striding the dangerous jungles and deserts of 
Africa aroused enormous interests in the European metropolitan 
reading public. As the interests over these men and their activities 
augmented, a corpus of both real and fictional heroes – missionaries, 
explorers, traders, early officials, lawyers, etc – quickly began to 
emerge.14 This includes the likes of James Bruce, Mungo Park, David 
Livingstone and Henry Stanley. They reflected the best of Europe; 
exemplars of brave men to emulate; exemplars of goodness and a clear 
manifestation of what greatness could achieve. Their findings and 
reports about the African landscapes and natives were crucial in 
establishing a determinate perception of non Europeans in general and 
Africans in particular. These reports not only largely corroborated 
existing myths but told of a state of emergency – a human race in urgent 
need of human and economic development. They told of a dark 
continent inhabited by tribal people or natives, whose lifestyles and 
                                                     
10  Singh, supra, note 8, 56. 
11  G.W.F. Hegel & L. Rauch, Introduction to the Philosophy of History: with Selections from 
the Philosophy of Right, Hackett Pub. Co, Indianapolis 1988; G.W.F. Hegel et al, 
Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Rev.ed., Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1992; C. Prior, Writing another Continent’s History: The British and Pre-
Colonial Africa, 1880-1939, 10 Historical Perspectives, (2007), 1-16; J.I. Levitt (Ed.), 
Africa: Mapping New Boundaries in International Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2008; H. 
Trevor-Roper, The Rise of Christian Europe, Thames and Hudson, London 1966. 
12  Hegel & Rauch, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, ibid.; Prior, ibid., 2-3.  
13  Prior, ibid., 12. 
14  Prior, ibid., 1. 
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customs were savage, barbaric, blood-thirsty, uncivilized, a throwback 
and thus potentially dangerous. The continent was also said to be 
devoid of law in general and international law in particular.15 This was 
in direct contradistinction with the glorification of European activities 
that were sarcastically construed as unyieldingly positive and 
“unremittingly good” despite considerable evidence to the contrary that 
the era was not exactly an age of reason.16 
 By declaring that Africa had no history prior to direct contact with 
Europe, the advocates of this construction were in retrospect laying a 
crucial caveat thus: Africans having made no history of their own, 
clearly had no development of their own. “Therefore, they were not 
properly human, and could not be left to themselves, but must be led 
towards civilization by other peoples. That is, by the peoples of 
Europe…”17 The above depiction no doubt carries a crucial significance. 
Not only does it postulate a rejection of African political, economic and 
cultural institutions but most importantly a strong indication of “moral” 
pro-activism — a “humanitarian” objective to rescue primitive peoples 
of Africa, and lead them towards modernity hence development. There 
was therefore a justified sense of imperial mission or “civilizing 
mission” as the colonizers themselves preferred to term it. Put 
differently, there was a felt responsibility, duty of care or philanthropic 
moral conscientiousness to give something (civilization)—call it 
development to the lost peoples of Africa; which in itself presupposed 
that there was no existing institution better placed to alter Africa for the 
better than European powers.18  
International law in the 19th century in essence defined Africa as 
economically backward by contrasting it with modernity that incarnated 
modernity and progress. The dynamic of differentiation emphasizing 
the different developmental levels between Europe and Africa was 
articulated around various cultural, socio-political and economic 
constructions. Unlike the primitive Africans, Europeans were 
profoundly schooled in arts and science, and this clearly manifested in 
their drive for progress. The agrarian and industrial revolutions which 
were vivid testimonies of progress clearly elevated European societies 
                                                     
15  Levitt, supra, note 11, 1; Prior, ibid., 2-3. 
16  J. Bacchus, Groping Towards Grotius:The WTO and The International Rule of Law, 
44 Harvard Journal of International Law, (2003), 534;  Prior, ibid., 3. 
17  B. Davidson, Africa in History: Themes and outlines, Phoenix, London 1992 (Rev. ed), 
xxii. 
18  J.L. Comaroff, Colonialism, Culture, and the Law: A Foreword, 26 Law and Social 
Inquiry, (2001), 310; Prior, supra, note 11, 10. 
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above all others in the mastery of the material world.19 I would examine 
the varying logics prophesying the economic backwardness of Africa in 
various sections of this work. 
A sharp cultural distinction drawn between the civilized Europeans 
and primitive or savage Africans was crucial in underlining the 
economic imperativeness of the civilizing mission. It was a monologue 
which projected “the other” as anything but alien. The encounter with 
Africa was an encounter with a primitivism given that Africa had been 
left behind in a throwback stage of human development. It was an 
encounter between a sovereign who could do as it pleased and a 
backward polity that was lacking in sovereignty, hence also lacking in 
rights by analogy. The continent had little or no semblance with a 
civilized identity whether in geopolitical, socio-economic or 
environmental outlooks.20 Not only were the inhabitants of the “dark” 
continent depicted as primitive, their entire land needed thorough 
economic development to make it more habitable for humankind. 
Unlike temperate Europe or the western world that was free from 
diseases, fertile and productive, the African tropics were grossly 
dangerous—its nature widely infested by pests and disease, coupled 
with the barbaric activities of African natives.21 
 The Law of Nations being an expression of European consciousness 
could not be logically applied to non-European or non-Christian nations. 
Henry Wheaton was clear and unambiguous about this in 1836, when he 
observed that there is no universal Law of Nations “which all mankind 
of all nations, ancient and modern, savage and civilized, Christian and 
pagan, have recognized or in practice…”22 While the international law of 
civilized Christian nations of Europe and America, is one thing, he 
contended, “that which governs the intercourse of the Mohamedan 
nations of the East with each other, and with Christians, is another and a 
                                                     
19  M. Adas, Contested Hegemony: The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the 
Civilizing Mission Ideology, 15 Journal of World History, (2004), 32. 
20  A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2005, 5; Koskenniemi, supra, note 4, 101. 
21  M. Havinden & D. Meredith, Colonialism and Development: Britain and its Tropical 
Colonies, 1850-1960, Routledge, London 1995; M. Diallo, “The Literature of Empire 
and the African Environment” in D.M. Mengara (ed.), Images of Africa—Stereotypes 
and Realities, African World Press, Trenton 2001, 105-126; D. Arnold, The Tropics and 
the Traveling Gaze: India, Landscapes and Science, 1800-1856, University of London 
Press, London, 2006. 
22  H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law: With a Sketch a Sketch of the History of the 
Science, Carey, Lea and Blanchard, Philadelphia 1836, 45. 
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very different thing.”23 Christianity as well as other highlights of 
cultural differentiation (wide development gap) propelled Europeans to 
see themselves as categorically superior to the “others.” Driven by such 
a mindset, the belief of superiority inevitably became a prejudice, 
standing in the way of clearly understanding the “others,” thus 
preventing the Europeans from engaging them as equals. As Tzvetan 
Todorov—the Franco-Bulgarian philosopher bluntly framed it, 
Europeans could not adequately understand the “others” because they 
tended to see more of their own identity each time they evoked the 
standard of civilization.24 Robert Phillimore stated in his 1879 thesis that 
international comity, like international law:  
 
“can only exist in the lowest degree amongst 
independent states; in its next degree amongst independent 
civilized states, and in its highest degree amongst 
independent Christian states.”25 
 
 Colonialism thus came with a completely new set of challenges, 
especially with regard to framing and regulating relations with the non-
European peoples, already qualified as uncivilized.26 International 
lawyers were quick to find solutions to the looming questions. A group 
of liberal thinkers led by Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns (1885-1902), Tobias 
Michael Carel Asser (1838-1913) and John Westlake (1828-1913) in 1868, 
published the first international law journal- Revue de Droit International 
et de Législation Comparée, as a professional forum for liberal legislative 
reform in Europe.27 In response to the inhumane conduct of the Franco-
Prussian war of 1870-71, these thinkers began working on a charter with 
Jean Gaspar Bluntschli (1808-1881) and eight other men for what in 1873 
became the Institut de droit international in Ghent, becoming the first 
                                                     
23  H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law: With a Sketch a Sketch of the History of the 
Science, Carey, Lea and Blanchard, Philadelphia 1836, 44-45. 
24  T. Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other, Harper and Row, New 
York 1992, [first published 1982], 165, 168. “Little or nothing of the…identity [of 
others] if we see, in place of that identity, a projection of ourselves or our ideals…’ 
[Emphasis added]. 
25  R. Phillimore, International Law: Inaugural Lecture, Butterworths, London 1879, 13; 
See also A. Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonisation in 
Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 Havard International Law Journal, (1999), 4-
5. 
26  G. Gozzi, History of International Law and Western Civilization, 9 International 
Community Law Review, (2007), 355. 
27  Koskenniemi, supra, note 4, 14. 
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professional association of international lawyers. Its primary goal was to 
function as “the scientific organ for the common legal consciousness of 
the civilized world.”28 The innovation here was the conception of 
international law as an expression of popular consciousness, and its 
eventual extension beyond Europe – in contradistinction to earlier 
attempts to restrict the realm of international law to Europe and the 
Christian world.29 
 True to their progressive mindset, 19th century international lawyers 
certified two separate regimes: one, governing relations amongst 
European sovereigns (or members of the family of nations) under formal 
equality, and the other, governing relations between European 
sovereigns with uncivilized non-Europeans under inequality, granting 
privileges to the former.30 This doctrine used in erecting these 
boundaries was dubbed the “standard of civilization,” and was 
interpreted to legally determine those that belonged to the family of 
nations from those that did not.31 Any nation that failed to meet it was 
by definition uncivilized.32 A non-civilized polity could be admitted into 
the sovereign family of nations only if other sovereign nations had 
effectively and clearly recognized it as meeting the civilization standard 
(the doctrine of recognition) — a clear indicator that the international 
community was to be strictly restricted to civilized nations who in fact 
had all achieved a particular level of economic development. 
Nevertheless, many questions remained unanswered. For instance, who 
or what decides what “civilization” meant? What were the legal results 
of using the standard of civilization as the trendsetter of international 
law and consequently development? Moreover, in what ways did (has) 
this vocabulary as a “standard” buttressed the exploitation of the 
colonies by the colonizers in the name of development?33 
 
 
                                                     
28  Koskenniemi, supra, note 4, 42; M. Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: 
Between Tradition and Renewal, 16 European Journal of International Law, (2005), 113-
124, 120. Article 1 of the Institute’s statute conceives the association as the “Juridical 
conscience of the civilized world.” 
29  Koskenniemi, supra, note 4, 49; Gozzi, supra, note 26, 354. 
30  A.B. Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of 
Imposition and Appropriation, 51 Harvard International Law Journal, (2010), 477; S.E. 
Merry, Law and Colonisation, 25 Law and Society Review, (1991), 890.  
31  Gong, supra, note 9, 3. 
32  Ibid., 3-5. 
33  Moses, supra, note 8, 3; Singh, supra, note 8, 73, 74, & 77. 
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2.  Advanced versus Backward, Standard of civilization and the 
Progress Metaphor 
 During the second half of the 19th century when European powers 
annexed and formulated policies for Africa, jurists and theologians far 
from being observers were both actors and defenders of the subject 
matter. Just like European public lawyers of the preceding centuries 
(Francisco de Vitoria (1492-1546), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Samuel von 
Pufendorf (1632-1694), Emmerich Von Vattel (1714-1767), Bartolomé de 
las Casas (1484-1566), et al) who all advanced juridical justifications for 
the annexation of The Americas, 19th century international lawyers 
especially through the Institut de Droit International also afforded the 
legal basis for colonization by attaching endless focus on the cultural 
differences between Europeans and the “other”—framed as a distinction 
between civilization and barbarism.34 Their pronouncements were 
particularly relevant in explaining imperial actions and events, thereby 
legitimating the nature and function of moral humanitarianism behind 
the civilizing mission discourse. In an earlier pronouncement, an 
influential theologian, the Reverend Frederick Farrar famously asserted 
that lowly peoples had “not added one iota to the knowledge, the arts, 
the sciences, the manufactures, [and] the morals of the world.”35  
 While Africans were commonly described as primitive and 
backward, Europeans on the other hand were seen to be scientific, 
innovative, civilized, etc—attributes which by implication certified that 
they were advanced beings, hence superior to their colonized subjects. 
European civilization was essentially characterized by two broad 
attributes to wit: individualism and rationality—the two moved hand-
in-hand. While individualism enabled material progress, rationality on 
the other hand was the underpinning for scientific progress.36 The 
elevation of the Europeans naturally presupposed the denigrating and 
dehumanizing of the “other.” They were habitually defined by 
negatives—their economy was trapped at primitive levels of 
productivity, they lacked individuality, rationality, innovation and the 
                                                     
34  C. Sylvest, “Our Passion for Legality”: International Law and Imperialism in late 
Nineteenth-Century Britain, 34 Review of International Studies, (2008), 406; Adas, 
supra, note 19, 31. 
35  F. Farrar, Aptitudes of the Races, 5 Transactions of the Ethnological Society of London, 
(1867), 120. cf: Adas, ibid., 33. 
36  S. Alam, “Some Economic Results of the Civilising Mission,” (January 2005), 2, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=950876 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.950876, (Last 
accessed 3 May 2012). 
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power of reasoning, which were all tools for progress. In fact, they were 
deficient in all positive virtues of social and political order. The 
civilizing mission being a moral crusade naturally necessitates a 
protagonist who is more superior and advanced in reasoning, thinking 
and material understanding of the world.37 
 The 19th century was heavily punctuated by “Aryan” pride, 
depicting the grandeur of European civilization. This was the case for 
example with the ideological movement which emerged around 1870 in 
England and USA known as Social Darwinism, claiming a mastery in 
the understanding of primitive societies. Led by Herbert Spencer (1820-
1903), Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895) and Francis Galton (1822-
1911), the school fostered the concept of “survival of the fittest” as a 
solution to primitive societies; which essentially implied that the 
Caucasian race was superior to all others both biologically and in terms 
of human development, and were thus destined to rule over inferior 
peoples who might be impervious to progress.38 Such writings provided 
an influential ideological backbone for international lawyers to postulate 
a wide gap between the material development of Europeans and the 
colonized territories which was both empirically verifiable and 
physically obvious.  
 With the development gap having been drawn, European 
intervention in Africa was given a legal meaning, justified as vital to 
foster economic prosperity and growth, framed in terms of moral 
humanitarianism—a mandate for the advanced to rule the backward 
peoples and assist them to advance. It was an articulation of 
universalism premised on the narrative of progress.39 Humanity was 
thus progressing or bound to progress as a result of the civilizing 
mission. The fundamental distinction between the civilized and the 
primitive or the advanced and the backward was thus an enabler for the 
colonizers to articulate various areas of human endeavour that the non-
                                                     
37  Alam, ibid., 2-3. 
38  M. Hawkins, Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860-1945: Nature as 
Model and Nature as Threat, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997, 204-215; 
M. Page, Colonialism: An International Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopedia, ABC-
CLIO, Santa Barbara 2003, 206; P. Brantlinger, Victorians and Africans: The 
Genealogy of the Myth of the Dark Continent, 12 Critical Inquiry, (1985), 182; B. 
Magubane, A Critical Look at Indices Used in the Study of Social Change in Colonial 
Africa, 12 Current Anthropology,  (1971), 420. 
39   J. Pitts, “Boundaries of Victorian International Law,” in D. Bell (Ed.), Victorian 
Visions of Global Order, (2007), 70. The French statesman, Jules Ferry echoed similar 
sentiments in 1884 during a speech at the French Chamber of Deputies, maintaining 
that superior races had both a right over inferior races and a duty to civilize them. 
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European societies in general and Africa in particular lacked behind as 
well as propound a way out of their backwardness and economic 
stagnation.  
The idea of an international society or l’esprit d’internationalité which 
recognized the existence of common principles and the “superior unity 
of the great human society”40 became the basis for rallying behind the 
colonial conquest. The logic of progress and the promise of transforming 
backward peoples and societies towards modernity made international 
law particularly appealing and attractive. The British philosopher, John 
Stuart Mill was one of the first scholars to postulate a nexus between 
civilization and progress, stating that the 19th century was “pre-
eminently the era of civilization…whether we consider what has already 
been achieved, or the rapid advances making towards still greater 
achievements.” This assertion fits neatly with another made by Georg 
Schwarzenberger, the British International Lawyer who in 1955 stated 
that the nexus between [progress] civilization and international law is a 
basic question of international law.41 
By presenting themselves as the juridical conscience of the civilized 
world, international lawyers at the Institut de Droit International 
ultimately assumed the role of an absent international legislature that 
incarnated humanity’s conscience. As representatives of European 
sensibilities, they assumed a mandate to define international legal 
thought based on a shared legal consciousness (esprit d’internationalité), 
while envisaging Europe’s contribution to the backward world in 
political, economic and social contexts.42 L’esprit d’internationalité was by 
all intent and purposes a humanistic construct founded on aggressive 
altruism—a challenge to take up the so-called “White Man’s Burden” 
based on the theory of tutelage over backward peoples. For international 
lawyers such as August Von Blumerincq and Rolin-Jacquemyns, 
colonization was essentially a fulfillment of historical inevitability.43 
Rolin-Jacquemyns in particular accentuated the existence of what he 
termed “[a] law of progress”—the obligation for mankind to incessantly 
follow the path of improvement and development such that each phase 
                                                     
40  Koskenniemi, supra, note 4, 13. 
41  J.S. Mill, “Civilization” in J.M. Robson (Ed.), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. 
33, University of Toronto Press, Toronto 1991, 119; G. Schwarzenberger, “The 
Standard of Civilisation in International Law,” in G.W. Keeton & G. 
Schwarzenberger (eds.), Current Legal Problems, Stevens & Sons, London 1955, 212. 
42  R. Cryer, [Review Article] Déjà vu in International Law, 65 Modern Law Review, 
(2002), 932; See generally Koskenniemi, supra, note 4. 
43  Azikiwe, supra, note 2, 290-291; Koskenniemi, supra, note 4, 105. 
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of history must always be superior to the preceding phases.44 By the 
same token, there was an obligation on the part of civilized states and 
the advanced to impose the benefits of civilization on the backward 
peoples.  
 Having settled down on the sharp cultural difference between the 
civilized Europeans and the uncivilized “others”, international lawyers 
proceeded to use it as a barometer for drawing the boundaries of the 
community of states by devising a standard which was later termed the 
“standard of civilization in international law.” This classical standard in 
essence was:  
“a legal mechanism designed to set the benchmark for 
the ascent of non-European states to the ranks of the 
civilized ‘Family of Nations’ and with it, their full 
recognition under international law.”45  
 
This differentiation was critical because it effectively prevented 
“natives” from eventually invoking any sovereign authority over 
European incursions. Instead, they were bound to recognize Europe’s 
jus gentium to encroach upon their territory and develop it.  
 The encounter between Europe and Africa produced a hierarchical 
structure between cultures, with international law emerging as the 
arbiter to mediate the gap by employing the standard of civilization. The 
                                                     
44  G. Rolin-Jaequemyns, Les Principes Philosophiques du Droit International,  5 Revue 
de Droit International et de Legislation Comparee, (1886), 292. cf. E. Jouannet, “European 
Colonialism and Contemporary Neo-Colonialism: Notes on European International 
Law Treatises dating from 1850 to 1914,” http://cerdin.univ-
paris1.fr/IMG/pdf/European_Colonialism_and_Contemporary_Neo-
Colonialism.pdf.  
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standard was not only a trendsetter for progress but moreover a vector 
of inclusion or exclusion into the community of nations. It was the bar; 
for backward cultures or primitive societies could only progress by 
imitating and becoming more like civilized societies. African societies at 
the eve of colonial annexation were not just projected as lacking the 
political institutions and organization necessary for a functional state 
but moreover as deficient on every conceivable attributes of civilization. 
Anghie has stated that the most unique thing about the 19th century is 
that it explicitly adopted the civilizing mission and reflected its goals in 
its very vocabulary. This view has been concurred by Koskenniemi who 
has vividly elaborated on some of the key thoughts and themes of 19th 
century international law practice, to wit: the tension between 
sovereignty and individualism, economic growth on state power, 
secularism and most importantly, the belief in progress as a criterion for 
acceding into the community of states.46 Articulated along the contours 
of modernity, advancement, development, emancipation and rights, the 
civilizing mission essentially boiled down to two broad ideas of 
progress namely: the view of history as progress and progress as a 
criterion to belong to the community of nations.47 
To borrow the wordings of a 1950 European film, Africans were “just 
backward children”48 in the eyes of the Europeans. By diligently 
working towards development, Africa was expected to eventually join 
the community of nations at such a time that it had sized up with the 
standard of civilization. Africans like other non-Europeans could only 
accede to the family of nations by accepting Europe as their master—
“but to accept a master was proof that one was not equal.”49 The 
boundaries of the community of nations were delimited by different 
levels of development with western civilization being the barometer. 
The standard of civilization was a two-edged sword. While professing to 
lay out a platform for the eventual accession of non-Europeans into the 
community of nations, the standard crucially functioned to ostracize 
them at the same time.50 First it highlighted the differences between the 
two cultures and then proceeded to devise techniques based on the 
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different levels of development to bridge the gap. The differentiation 
was then used to legally justify countless theories and imperial policies. 
It was not until two decades after the World War II that most formerly 
colonized territories were considered to have attained sufficient 
development levels to join the family of nations. 
The overriding consensus amongst 19th century international legal 
scholars was that it was the duty of the civilized to bring progress and 
order to the savages beyond Europe, with the standard of civilization 
seen as the international legal principle necessary to regulate relations 
between the advanced and the backward peoples. The standard 
provided a structuring formula for accommodating the “other” into the 
society of states. The German philosopher, Christian Wolff conceived 
the civilizing mission as an opportunity to export the benefits of 
European civilization to non-Europeans—a duty to Europeans to work 
towards perfection not only of themselves, but moreover the perfection 
of the backward as well.51  
 Non-European societies had to become civilized in order to join the 
society of states. This involved the “other” completely dismantling its 
customary laws and socio-economic attitudes and then recreating itself 
in the image of Europe—that is, advocating for mimicry. The colonizers 
obviously wanted the colonized to become recognizable, almost the 
same like themselves but not quite. They wanted the colonized to reform 
but remain different so that the role of the colonizer could be clearly 
exposed. In other words, they wanted Africa to be altered in the image 
of progress but to remain different even in its completion stage.52 
The civilizing mission was essentially European particularism 
assuming the guise of universalism, or as Koskenniemi has summed it 
up—it was an exclusion-inclusion discourse:  
 
“exclusion in terms of a cultural argument about the 
otherness of the non-European that made it impossible to 
extend European rights to the native, inclusion in terms of 
the native’s similarity with the European, the native’s 
otherness having been erased by a universal 
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humanitarianism under which international lawyers sought 
to replace native institutions by European sovereignty.”53 
 
3.   Sovereignty and Civilization 
3.1  After Westphalia: Sovereignty in the 19th Century 
Although international lawyers at the Institut de Droit International 
gave the green lights and badly needed legitimation for colonial 
injustice, some recent scholarship has tended to insinuate that the 
complicity was not so intentional. Their overriding goal, these 
arguments hold, was the exportation of droit publique de l’Europe and the 
expansion of European civilization into the dark corners of the globe. 
That is to say their attitudes and pronouncements were grounded more 
on conscience rather than on conspiracy.54 This postulation has 
provoked varying debates both in support and against the submission. 
As Koskenniemi has remarked, some international lawyers – the likes of 
Gaston Jèze and Charles Saloman – saw outright hypocrisy where 
international lawyers of the Institut professed a civilizing mission. Not 
only was the fervent belief in European superiority shared by all the 
men of 1873, it was ultimately reflected in their eventual 
recommendations for the expansion of European sovereignty into Africa 
and other non-European societies. It is also obvious that their voices 
tended to follow that of their metropole’s wide ambition in Africa and 
elsewhere. They were unapologetically supportive of their home 
country’s conscience juridique.55 
As afore-noted, 19th century international lawyers postulated a hefty 
gap in terms of cultural differences, understandably between the 
civilized or advanced Europeans and the uncivilized or backward 
others. Next, they devised a series of techniques aimed at bridging this 
gap, framed in terms of a mission to civilize the uncivilized, liberate 
them out of their backward state and lead them towards progress 
                                                     
53  Koskenniemi, supra, note 4, 130. 
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(development). My contention in this section is that beyond the progress 
rhetoric, the elaboration of such a sharp cultural distinction was crucial 
first in legally excluding Africans and other non-Europeans from the 
realm of sovereignty, as well as giving the concept (sovereignty) an 
expanded meaning. 
There is an underlying consensus that international law is universal. 
As a multilateral institution, the discipline encompasses a set of 
doctrines that apply to all states, irrespective of geographical location, 
specific cultures, religion and/or political organizations. According to 
Anghie, Fidler and Lindley, 56 the universality of international law is a 
relatively recent development. The entire mission civilizatrice was 
fundamentally anchored on a Universalist rhetoric. Nineteenth century 
jurists and publicists perceived the forcible acquisition of territories in 
Africa in terms of “Enlightenment Universalism”—that is, an 
engagement to uplift the inferior peoples of the Dark Continent towards 
progress.  
By Enlightenment Universalism, they were asserting a catalogue of 
universal values incumbent on humankind—the enjoyment of which 
was dependent on the levels of civilization. Jurists and publicists of the 
century importantly contended that the emancipation campaign was 
going to liberate natives from oppression from their tribal leaders, 
eradicate slavery, backwardness and disease.57 The significance of such 
images as “backward,” “Dark Continent,” “inferior,” “uncivilized,” 
“disease,” etc cannot be over-emphasized. Once the image of the “other” 
was validated as backward and wanting, the need for Europeans to 
civilize and lead them towards progress (development) became all the 
more transparent with the universalist rhetoric seducing support for the 
mission as a force for good.58 International law specifically strengthened 
the moral argument that the civilizing mission was doing a generous 
service by putting Africa on a platform of progress. Order, peace and 
development were the projected goals of the mission. The General Act of 
the Berlin Conference, 1884 valorized the main objectives of the 
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civilizing mission as “instructing the natives and bringing home to them 
the blessings of civilization.”59 
 It is only through colonization in the 19th century that the discipline 
and its sources became a universal system. As Anghie and others have 
asserted, international law did not precede the encounter between 
Europe and Africa. It was rather a product of it. Thus, colonization 
according to this analysis is central, not peripheral to international law. 
The assumption that it is only international law that shaped life in the 
colonies while not incorrect is at best incomplete. The conditions in the 
colonies were crucial in enabling the discipline assume its global 
juridical character. International law in general encompasses many 
colonial themes of the nineteenth century, most notable amongst which 
is sovereignty as understood since the century and the insistence on 
civilization as a trendsetter for belonging in the family of nations. Most 
importantly, all sources of international law contained in article 38 (1) of 
the ICJ statute are fully connected to the standard of civilization. Article 
38 (1) (c) specifically pinpoints “general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations” as a source of international law.60 The unity exhibited 
by European powers towards one another in Africa was testimony to 
how far civilization had transformed Europeans and enabled them to 
completely detach their identity from savagery and backwardness 
which every man was in bondage to in the throwback age.  
The conception of international law as a law of progress naturally 
inspired the vision to impose civilization on non-Europeans, hence the 
exportation of droit publique de l’Europe to colonized territories and the 
universalizing of the discipline. By identifying themselves as the rightful 
barons to codify the morality of states, European international lawyers 
were able to determine what eventually constituted objects of 
universality. It is only through colonization that many of the normative 
doctrines of the discipline were forged out as an attempt to create a legal 
system that could account for relations between the European and non-
European worlds in the colonial confrontation.61 
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The Peace of Westphalia (1648) which ended the thirty years war in 
Europe is commonly regarded as signaling the origin of the sovereignty 
doctrine. The thirty years war was characterized by the struggle for self-
determination in identity and government against the hegemonic power 
of the Holy Roman Empire, with the Westphalian peace – actually two 
separate treaties, Münster and Osnabrück – resolving the conflict by 
validating the state system and affirming the full juridical autonomy of 
every state in managing its own affairs. All states were deemed to enjoy 
sovereign equality – that is, all sovereign states were conceived as 
juridical equals to one another – according to a newly formulated caveat 
that international relations should be driven by balance of power 
considerations instead of ideals of Christendom.62 Ever since, 
international lawyers have habitually adhered to the rigid concept of 
sovereignty: most of them finding it difficult to see past Westphalian 
sovereignty—even as the concept has evolved over the last two 
centuries. Conceiving the doctrine as monolithic and absolute in 
application, scholars generally pay only scanty attention to historical 
events beyond Westphalia. In fact, Westphalian sovereignty remains 
synonymous amongst many scholars even for our current system of 
sovereign states.63  
The sovereignty doctrine has nevertheless come under intense 
scrutiny from recent scholarships—the likes of Anthony Anghie, 
Stephen Krasner, Peter Fitzpatrick and Robert Williams Jr. who have 
fiercely challenged the rigid Westphalian construction as overrated. 
While not denying that the history of sovereignty is largely one of 
Westphalian geographical extension, these authors have postulated that 
sovereignty is nevertheless not solely a Westphalian derivative as it has 
over time been severely influenced in fundamental ways by European 
colonial encounters. They have looked beyond Wesphalia, arguing that 
it is the aggressive expansion of driot publique de l’Europe through 
colonization that provided the basis for the modern conception of the 
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term.64 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former UN Secretary General while 
echoing the same sentiment and affirming that sovereignty has in fact 
never been as vibrant as legal scholars seem to suggest, characteristically 
stated thus:  
“it is undeniable that the centuries-old doctrine of 
absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands, and 
was in fact never so absolute as it was conceived to be in 
theory.”65 
  
The bottom-line of this critical scholarship is to the effect that 
Westphalian peace did not just lay down a universal doctrine of state 
sovereignty but most importantly granted European powers with the 
monopoly of legal personality. For example, the juridical regulation of 
war and warfare, the development of law of the sea were not primarily 
aimed at establishing peace or laisser-faire for all in continental waters, 
but rather at fortifying European powers or sovereign states with 
legitimate reasons to wage war and to parade the high seas for colonial 
expansion and trade.66 It is also very telling that 19th century 
international lawyers were deeply concerned with the legal basis for 
colonization and the eventual status of colonized subjects. As Anghie 
has convincingly argued, the civilizing mission, which carefully rested 
on the ‘dynamic of difference’, was at the forefront of the development 
of the sovereignty principle in the 19th century. Sovereignty has always 
rested with the civilized and developed to the exclusion of the 
uncivilized and backward. Moreover:  
 
“the structure of sovereignty, the identity of sovereignty, 
no less than the identity of an individual or a people, is 
formed by its history, its origins in and engagement with the 
colonial encounter.”67 
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 As colonization loomed in the 19th century, international lawyers 
were quick to realize that the non-European world would pose 
enormous an enormous challenge to the international system, given that 
they were not at its origin. International law was specific to the 
community of civilized states from where it originally emanated. How 
would non-Europeans be governed, and on what basis would their 
lands be occupied? What is the relationship between civilization and 
sovereignty? Why could moral principles within international law not 
be extended to indigenous African peoples?68 In response to these 
concerns, they revitalized the classical Westphalian concept of 
sovereignty which prescribed that states could only be bound by rules to 
which they have consented. All sovereign countries by virtue of the 
Westphalian standard enjoyed absolute power over their national 
territories. Backward non-Europeans – the likes of Africans typically 
lacked this sovereignty – were excluded from the civilized international 
society or family of nations and most importantly could thus not decide 
on their own fate. It was recurrently argued that they lacked reason and 
self-control and were in some other ways not yet fully human. The only 
sovereignty at stake even on non-European soils was solely between 
European (sovereign) rivals.69 
 The development of international law in the 19th century was 
essentially along the pattern of sovereignty. Using the dynamic of 
difference, international law established a group that was entitled to 
benefit from sovereignty (the civilized and developed) and certain 
others that were to be excluded from its sphere (the uncivilized and 
backward). It further empowered sovereign powers to dominate and 
exercise unlimited authority over the excluded groups. Crucial to the 
morality of the annexation of Africa is the European understanding of 
the rights of non-European peoples against the civilized peoples of 
Europe with respect to sovereignty over territory. Plainly put, did 
Europeans have any rights to occupy and exercise sovereignty over 
lands inhabited by Africans?70 To address these concerns, international 
lawyers adopted the position that common universal principles were 
going to guide European expansionism, mutual relationships and 
development in the colonies.  
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3.2  The Interplay of Free Trade and Private property  
Sovereignty whether in Westphalian or colonial contexts as a general 
rule always came with the privileges of statehood. A sovereign polity 
upon joining the family of nations was ultimately bound by certain 
rights and obligations. For example, it was treated as the equal of all 
others (sovereign equality), was recognized by all other members of the 
family of nations (doctrine of recognition), was entitled to non-
intervention, and was allowed to fully govern its own affairs. A 
sovereign polity was also bound with the obligations of guaranteeing 
basic rights—of life, property, travel, commerce—to both its own 
peoples and foreigners; it had to have an organized government and 
capacity for self-defense; had to adhere to international law: in a 
nutshell, it had to conform to the norms and practices of the civilized 
international society.71  
 The invasion of the backward by the advanced was not seen by 
international lawyers as amounting to trespass; instead it was a 
humanitarian fulfillment based on economic necessity. This holds well 
with the cliché that man by nature is a gregarious being—that is, he is 
migratory. He moves from place to place. While the raison-d’être for such 
movements by the civilized is presumed to be for the purpose of 
discovery or economic development; by the primitive it is usually for 
nomadic reasons as he supposedly just roams to anywhere that nature is 
kinder to him.72 Such a mindset inspired international lawyers to 
formulate a doctrine of universal ownership for the civilized or the so-
called terra nullius rule. The narrative is not a straightforward-jacket-rule 
though. When is a territory open for acquisition or barred from 
annexation? Does the occupation of a land impliedly confer sovereignty 
on its occupants? Conversely, are original inhabitants precluded from 
claims to sovereignty once annexed? 
In addressing the above questions, I intend to shed some light into 
the cloud surrounding the ambivalence of the sovereignty logic that 19th 
century international lawyers legitimated for the backward peoples. A 
terra nullius land has been defined as: 
 
“a tract of territory…not subject to any sovereignty—
either because it has never been so subject to, or, having 
once been in that condition, has been abandoned—[with the 
consequence that] the sovereignty over it is opened to 
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acquisition by a process analogous to that by which 
property can be acquired in an ownerless thing.”73 
 
Going by the above definition, a terra nullius land corresponded to 
lands inhabited by the uncivilized—yet to be transformed through 
economic activities or development. Thus, all territories that were not in 
the possession of members of the family of nations were by implication 
terra nullius or territorium nullius. Given that the earth was for 
occupation and to be used in a civilized way, it follows that all terra 
nullius lands were subject to universal ownership—that is, the right to 
develop world resources, the right to exploit the weaker races and the 
right to civilize backward peoples.74 Natives presumably wasted the 
land with their rudimentary cultivation practices and philosophy of 
communal ownership. The civilizing mission enabled Europeans to 
regulate land tenure according to property rights as was the practice in 
Europe. International law had to as a matter of necessity mandated all 
terra nullius lands to civilized societies legalizing their actions each time 
these lands were annexed. The English jurist Travers Twiss, a fervent 
proponent of the terra nullius rule, affirmed in 1884 that the civilized 
could legitimately acquire “unoccupied” territories through discovery 
followed by occupation.75 
How did Africa fit into the terra nullius discourse? Better still, how 
did international lawyers frame the position of “natives” on the lands 
that were naturally theirs? The legal minds essentially introduced two 
economic institutions that would eventually shape the economic future 
of Africa for centuries to wit: trade and private property. Both rights 
went hand-in-hand and were initially enforced through capitulations—
that is, a barrage of unequal ambiguous treaties between European 
invaders and African tribal chiefs, some of which were signed at 
gunpoint. While the European sovereigns gained ultimate titles to the 
lands, natives were relegated to no more than a right of practical use 
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over restricted patches of land. The treaties were an implied guarantee 
to the natives that the sovereign would develop and protect their 
borders.76 The British politician Joseph Chamberlain in 1888 justified the 
terra nullius rule by providing that “the tribes and Chiefs that exercise 
dominion in them cannot possibly occupy the land or develop its 
capacity.”77 
The idea of treaties between Europeans and natives without doubt 
represents a fundamental paradox. Were the colonizers having it both 
ways—eating their cake and having it back at one and the same time? To 
be specific, how could entities which as the colonizers claimed, lacked 
sovereignty and were too primitive to understand the concept78 or its 
importance turn around and cede their lands and rights through 
treaties? Answers to these concerns certainly rested in various juridical 
postulations, all framed around the economic ideas of trade and private 
property. Varying juridical postulations insinuated that although 
African tribes clearly lacked civilized thinking hence sovereignty and 
could thus not cede away what they did not have, they nevertheless 
understood and had ownership (property) rights over their lands.79 The 
right of ownership could be conveyed by the natives only to the 
discovering sovereign. Every claim of discovery or occupation was thus 
traditionally fortified by treaties with tribal chiefs. While the European 
discovers could always exercise unlimited dominion over the land, 
“native [could] never be accorded more than the right to its 
occupancy.”80 
To that effect, King Leopold II of Belgium, for example, acting 
through the Comité d’Etudes du Haut Congo (the Comité), which was later 
also renamed as the International Congo Association (ICA) with Henry 
Standley as its pioneer manager, signed a barrage of various concession 
treaties with native Chiefs, thus effectively making him the grand 
emperor of tropical central Africa. He nationalized nine-tenths of the 
land and restricted natives only to areas in which they had their huts—
where they allowed to use the land for domestic cultivation.  
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In general, the treaties with tribal rulers were crucial in giving a 
juridical colour to European imperial acquisitions. This stems from the 
fact that all western nations recognized these treaties as binding—they 
complied with general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. 
The development of the lands said to be the primary objective of these 
treaties, the downside is that it highlighted the natives’ backwardness 
thus effectively undercutting or preventing him from joining the 
civilized society of nations. In order for the sovereign’s discovery of land 
to amount to a claim of sovereignty, the right of occupancy of natives 
had to be materially transferred through a concession treaty. While 
assuming the character of a consensual agreement, the real intent was 
first and foremost to lawfully keep the natives in subjugation and 
moreover, to wade-off all potential European rivalries. For instance, in 
1888, the British entered a concession treaty with Chiefs Lobengula and 
Matabele, whereupon they purportedly leased away the “complete and 
exclusive charge over all metals and minerals” along the coast. Like 
several other cooked treaties, this was later interpreted to mean all of the 
land. A year later, in 1889, Lobengula wrote to Queen Victoria 
complaining of duress by white invaders in the following words: “The 
white people are troubling me much about gold. If the Queen hears that 
I have given away the whole country, it is not so.”81 
The General Act of the Berlin Conference, 1884 importantly 
embodied the sentiment of free trade and private property, emphasizing 
that every African colonial power must accord special protection to 
foreigners and the property of all European “Christian missionaries, 
scientists and explorers.”82 As Gerrit Gong did point out, international 
lawyers considered the protection of western rights and property as the 
minimum requirement for civilization.83 Whenever any polity was 
unwilling or unable to meet this standard because of the imperfections 
of its civilization or other deficiencies, international lawyers contended 
that civilized states could freely annex it as a moral duty in order to 
safeguard the rights and property of all Europeans. But what is perhaps 
even more puzzling is the eventual fate of the colonized subjects. 
Westlake responded by propounding that international law naturally 
leaves the treatment of natives to the conscience of the civilized state to 
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which sovereignty is awarded.84 The Swiss jurist, Johann Kaspar 
Bluntschli concurred noting that “international law depends on 
humanity’s consciousness for its rights.”85 
 The insistence on trade and private property was clearly illustrative 
of the fact that the European mission in Africa was first and foremost 
economic in nature. With the introduction of modern commerce, 
commercial and economic relations between Europe and Africa was 
harmonized based on western standards with the test for acceptance 
into the community of nations dependent on whether a political entity 
was able and willing to adequately protect the life, liberty and property 
of foreigners.86 In addition to this requirement, the right to property also 
importantly required some minimum degree of social organization.  
 Westlake, for example, emphasized on the existence of a 
“government” as a deciding factor for any immunity to terra nullius 
acquisition by Europeans. A government going by his definition existed 
as from such a time when it could adequately grant protection to 
Europeans, such that they could conveniently carry on the complex life 
to which they have become accustomed in their home countries.87 
Members of the family of nations neatly corresponded to this definition 
because they, as a matter of practice, concluded treaties that protected 
foreigners, private property and regulated trade. Adam Smith laid out 
three basic conditions necessary for economic growth and progress to 
wit: peace, easy taxes and a tolerable administration of justice. 
Governments were necessary to guarantee law and order; markets did 
the rest through the invisible hand—that is, the free interplay of demand 
and supply.88 Given that African primitive societies were neither capable 
of functioning as a veritable government nor able to protect persons and 
private property, European intervention became all the more 
indispensible in order to enlighten them on ways of civilization.89 
While highlighting civilization as the foundation of any state, the 
German jurist, Lassa Oppenheim cited four elements as basic for every 
sovereign to wit: country or nation, people, government and sovereign 
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government.90 If Africans were still living on subsistence or in the state 
of nature, then it goes without saying that their land was by definition 
terra nullius. 
The fundamental polemic with colonial sovereignty is not just the 
imperialism of Europeans over the Africans (or non-Europeans in 
general) but more critically, the ease with which international law sided 
with the civilizing mission, effectively insinuating a new meaning to 
sovereignty as the exclusive privilege for the developed to lord over the 
backward. The purport of the colonial construct, it will appear though, 
was arguably not so much to disqualify the Africans from the realm of 
sovereignty but rather to manage it on their behalf (tutelage)—
purportedly bringing Africans under the protection of European 
sovereigns whose gift of civilized justice was in turn going to liberate 
them from the tyranny of tribal chiefs and general backward condition. 
It was alleged that colonial administration was going to bring the best 
results to the natives in terms of economic development. The Scottish 
jurist James Lorimer, for example, contended that colonization acted to 
improve the economic conditions of all who were subjected to it.91 Put 
differently, the colonial discourse of sovereignty perpetuated an 
insinuation that sovereignty as a concept was at odds with 
backwardness, and thus for it to be extended to the African continent, its 
constituents necessarily had to earn it by attaining a particular level of 
development.  
How did international law balance the European claims of “right” of 
conquest against the ownership rights of African natives based on 
sovereignty over territory? In the preceding sections, I have discussed 
                                                     
90  L. Oppenheim, International Law, A Treatise, Longmans, London 1937, 112. In his 
book, A Treatise on International Law, the English Jurist, William Edward Hall, echoed 
a similar sentiment as Oppenheim on the issue of trade and private property, noting 
that sovereign states were self-sufficient entities that adequately protected the rights 
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to equality as between themselves and the subjects of the state.” W.E. Hall, A Treatise 
on International Law, Clarendon Press,  Oxford 1924, 58-59 (Emphasis added). 
91  P. Muldoon, The Sovereign Exceptions: Colonization and the Foundation of Society, 
17 Social and Legal Studies, (2008), 60, 68, & 70; J. Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of 
Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities, Blackwood & 
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how the standard of civilization was projected as a barometer for human 
progress and consequently a ground for admission into the family of 
nations. The definition of a civilized society was premised on the 
insistence of a political organization as a deciding factor. Lindley has 
qualified a political organisation thus:  
 
“[If a] numerous society is permanently united by the 
habitual conformity of the bulk of its members to recognized 
standards in their relations inter se; if laws set or imposed by 
the general opinion of the community are habitually 
observed or their breach punished, eventhough no one 
person, or no determinate body of persons short of the 
whole community, is charged with their enforcement, such a 
society should, it would seem be regarded as a political 
one.”92 
 
Crucial to the construction of this argument is the portrayal of 
Africa’s lack of recognized political institutions as a ground to be denied 
basic rights in international law. Jurists contended that there were no 
effective or recognizable legal or political institutions on the African 
continent prior to the arrival of the Europeans. Given that rules of 
international law are in place only to protect its members, entities that 
felt outside the family of nations were essentially precluded from 
enjoying the legal protections afforded by the discipline. The sharp 
cultural distinction between the advanced and the backward did not 
make much sense except when matched by the different levels of 
economic development and the evidence of political organization.  
Nineteenth century juridical discourse over sovereignty presents a 
particular paradox, notably, the evolution from the struggle over 
national territorial sovereignty as a legal right (as evidenced by the 
peace of Westphalia) to the legal and political basis for excluding the 
“other” from exercising sovereignty over their national territories (as 
evidenced by the colonization of Africa). In other words, while 
Westphalian sovereignty was confined to territorial sovereignty, colonial 
sovereignty on the other hand conferred the civilized with a right of 
conquest of the backward peoples. To talk like Carl Smith, the sovereign 
suddenly became “he who decides the exception.”93 Was this an 
administration of justice or a corruption of the law? Jurists were 
                                                     
92  Lindley, supra, note 56, 22. 
93  C. Smith, Political Theology: Four Essays on the Concept of Sovereignty, MIT Press, 
Cambridge 1985, 5. See also, Koskenniemi, supra, note 4, 428. 
218 Forji  
[JAIL, Volume 6, Number 1, 2013] 
apparently uniform in favour of the former. In the case of African 
colonisation, the exception was apparently more important than the 
rule. It is not a particularly strange thing with international law for the 
exception eventually becoming the rule, especially when it is backed by 
a moral caveat or arguments for national security. Such is the case with 
the doctrine of necessity, the right of preemptive strike, humanitarian 
intervention and the right of self-defense. 
The acquisition of African lands was in fact projected as a mere act of 
economic necessity that was going to enable the natives to benefit from 
the amenities of western civilization, thus radically transforming their 
backward conditions. The tribal leaders were despotic, superstitious, 
and failed to protect persons and private property. The society as a 
whole was said to have no real history except for nomadic activities and 
despotic tribal institutions. The British colonial administrator, Lord 
Frederick Lugard, in The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, justified 
economic imperialism by propounding that since the industrial world is 
dependent on raw materials civilized humanity was in retrospect 
endowed with a universal right of discovery to develop every 
undeveloped resource wherever they happened to be. In other words, if 
the natives had no intellectual ability to care for their resources, it 
follows that it was then incumbent on civilized humanity to care for it.94  
If the pathway of the deer, as funnily remarked by Azikiwe, is the 
only realistic way to realize constructive progress, that deer must 
logically surrender its path.95 By intruding thus on native lands, 
European powers were in effect asserting a de facto sovereignty over 
them. By overthrowing African despotic rulers and destroying the poor 
yielding system of cultivation, the colonial powers were effectively 
honouring a conscience call to share the fruits of civilization with the 
world’s backward peoples.96 Capitulations laid the general groundwork 
for conducting business in Africa, with the standard of civilization 
providing the legal basis on which Europe and Africa could conduct 
economic, social and political relations. One legal importance of treaties 
with tribal leaders is the apparent insinuation that the natives were in 
effect inviting the Europeans to civilize their territories. The standard of 
civilization then justified an extraterritorial jurisdiction since Africans 
themselves going by the treaties were confirming their condition as 
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uncivilized and economically backward. Accordingly, J. de Hornung, 
asserted that:  
 
“les civilisés doivent donner l’exemple d’une justice 
supérieure … les nations civilisées doivent aider les ‘races 
inférieures’ à entrer dans le système politique des Etats.”97 
 
The Covenant of the League of Nations in its article 22 famously 
codified the right of colonization.98 
The moral crusade to develop and transform the natives was 
indispensable for any hope of them eventually joining the civilized 
society of states. They could only attain such progress through the 
intervention of Europe and submission to civilization standards, 
especially with respect to protecting persons and private property. 
It has been observed that at least three kinds of relations could have 
possibly developed in the aftermath of European contact with the 
“other.” The first impulse may have been to leave the natives to their 
own fate. Secondly, the natives could have been ethnically cleansed so as 
to purify the world from primitiveness and backwardness. Lastly, the 
advanced peoples of Europe with their mastery of the material world 
could help improve their precarious condition by leading them towards 
progress in every aspect, including facilitating unrestricted trade with 
civilized sovereigns.99 The first and second possibilities were 
inconceivable as Europeans could not in their good civilized conscience 
allow African natives to their own destructive fate; they could not allow 
them to continue destroying their lands and vegetation unknowingly; or 
to continue neglecting their natural resources that forever went un-
expropriated and untapped. As for the third option, not only was it the 
best, it was the only remedy to natives’ backwardness—it enabled 
Europeans to guide the natives towards improved labour and better 
management of natural resources, hence, towards advancement and 
economic prosperity.100 
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4.   The Shift from Natural Law to Positivism 
The 19th century has cemented its place in history as the century of 
European colonization. Although many contemporary legal 
commentators have with good reason been fiercely alarmed by the 
aggressive expeditions into the African hinterlands and elsewhere 
around the globe, events of the era were all but a déjà-vu in action as well 
as legal pandering. The Americas had fallen under their control since 
1492 when Christopher Columbus together with other European 
explorers stormed the continent. Mainland Asia and the Oceanic were 
the next targets, respectively in the 16th and 17th centuries.101 
Up until the nineteenth century, jurists variously conceived the Law 
of Nations (Jus Gentium) as natural law or emanating from natural law; 
with the central argument being that reason contained rules of justice 
that governed relations between nations. Since all human activity 
according to natural law was bound by an overarching morality, 
sovereign states were in retrospect also bound by principles of natural 
law.102 Two early works of Francisco de Vitoria in the 16th century to wit: 
De Indis noviter inventis (On the Newly Discovered Indies) and De Jure 
Bellis Hispanorum in Barbaros (Concerning the Law in Spain's Barbarian 
Wars) specifically dealt with the legal problems arising out of the 
European conquest vis-à-vis the indigenous peoples.103 While 
highlighting the theme of reason, de Vitoria justified the violence on 
non-Europeans by providing that all men and entities, including Popes 
and Kings were subject to the higher moral authority of God.104 
Natural law was closely bound to Divine law given that the content 
of natural law was purely based on reason. Jurists and theologians 
professed the authority of Europeans to bring the wealth and riches of 
foreign lands “within the ambit of Christian rulers and to authorize 
conversion to Christianity—by force if necessary—according to the 
medieval doctrine of ‘just war.’”105 The Indian natives were deemed as 
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possessing reason just like everyone else, including the Europeans. The 
French philosopher, Charles-Louis Montesquieu in his political treatise, 
Esprit des Lois distinguished between “laws in general” which were 
applicable to all human beings as they were based on human reason and 
“Laws in Particular” that were restricted to the will of each 
government.106 
The natural law content of international law was indeed universal in 
outlook—the reason why it could be extended to non-Europeans. What 
made the law of nations universal in the first place was the claim that it 
was grounded on natural law whose scope cut across all cultural 
differences and beliefs. The German jurist Samuel Pufendorf, for 
instance, remarked that natural law was the foundation of international 
law and extended to all religious confessions.107 Although various 
authors deferred as to the extent, there was however a consensus that 
natural law from its very onset was a force for rights to all—Europeans 
and non-Europeans alike. Varying opinion by European international 
lawyers however insinuated that the Indian indigenes failed to exercise 
reason; instead they chose to live in savage backward conditions which 
were at variance with jus gentium—thus necessitating the intervention of 
Europeans to enlighten them.108 Tacitly, they had themselves to blame 
for any violence inflicted on them by Europeans if they failed to exercise 
reason by embracing the invaders—who were architects of 
development. Going by this narrow paradoxical line of reasoning, 
common sense should have dictated to the Indians that they would fare 
better under modernity rather than savagery.  
To make sure that European acquisitions in The Americas were in 
accordance with the Law of Nations, imperial powers largely abided to 
the Requerimiento, which was a declaration of sovereignty and war. 
Written by Juan López de Palacios Rubios—a professor of law at 
Salamanca who doubled as Council of Castile jurist in 1510, the 
Requerimiento provided the theoretical basis and doctrinal foundation of 
Spanish acquisitions in The Americas.109 As a prerequisite, the reading 
of the Requerimiento was to be duly witnessed by a notary; informing 
indigenous peoples what would happen to them if they failed to submit 
voluntarily to European authority. A typical requerimiento read thus: 
                                                     
106  Koskenniemi, supra, note 4, 100. 
107  G. Gozzi, The Particularistic Universalism of International Law in the Nineteenth 
Century, 52 Havard International Law Journal, (2010), 75. 
108  Wolfe, supra, note 76, 135. 
109  See L. Pereña, La idea de justicia en la conquista de América, Mapfre, Madrid 1992, 37. 
222 Forji  
[JAIL, Volume 6, Number 1, 2013] 
“We shall forcibly enter your country and shall make 
war against you in all ways and manners that we can ... we 
shall take your wives and your children, and shall make 
slaves of them... and we shall take away your goods and do 
all the harm and danger that we can.. .and we protest that all 
the deaths and losses which shall accrue from this are your 
fault, and not of their Highnesses, or ours, nor of the 
gentlemen who come with us.”110 
 
International law as natural law clearly had many voices, religion 
simply just one of them. In other words, it was very elastic in scope. The 
convergence of Christianity and European natural law already in the 16th 
and 17th centuries was evidently a tool to exclude the other. Since the 
Law of Nations as natural law relied largely on natural law, its content 
was accordingly imbued in moral principles. As a result, the underlining 
content of the discipline was gradually compromised and corrupted by 
the colonial experience.111 It left everyone uneasy—the Europeans as 
well as the non-Europeans, albeit for different reasons.  
The Universalist basis of natural law which made international law 
applicable to everyone—civilized as well as the primitive was evidently 
as pretentious as it was misleading. While the reasoning clearly implied 
that universal humanity had to acknowledge the “freedom of Indians 
alongside the rights of Europeans (as with all peoples) to trade and 
travel, and to preach the Christian faith, within their lands,” Europeans 
evidently had no intention to validate such rights.112 The law of nations 
may have been projected as universal in scope, yet it was unmistakably 
marketed as something uniquely European.  
Due to its uniquely European content, it is only through imposition 
that jus gentium could be extended to non-Europeans. Some jurists—the 
likes of Bluntschli and Lorimer even invoked the universality of natural 
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law to justify the inferiority of non-Europeans vis-à-vis western 
civilization. Lorimer, for instance, while dividing humanity into savages, 
civilized and barbarians asserted that the backward condition of the 
Indians was in itself testimony of their inferiority.113 The Indians on their 
part as expected were frustrated at the violence and abuses constantly 
inflicted on them and their lands, all in the name of progress. While they 
were bound to comply to all the violence inflicted on them by the 
European colonialists; natural law in retrospect did not grant them any 
right of self defense which by common sense would have translated into 
a just war. Indigenous peoples were rendered “susceptible to physical 
force if they presumed to contest Europe’s self-evident claims on the 
ground.”114 If they dared retaliate, they were going to have themselves 
to blame, for international law saw them as unlawful combatants. 
The climate at the dawn of the 19th century was therefore ripe for a 
new vision or direction. Europe launched its next colonial assault – the 
African continent being one of the main targets – under a new 
“promising” philosophy known as positivism: a belief in sovereign 
states as guarantor of rights rather than the belief in a Christian God. 
This positivist framework which was championed by liberal 
philosophers ensured that the “Law of Nations claimed no higher 
authority than that which nations agreed between themselves.”115 The 
move from naturalism to positivism came with a crucial significance, 
namely: the need to ensure certainty in the law as opposed to the 
uncertainty that characterized natural law—plainly put, the need to 
assert absolute sovereignty in international relations.116 By so doing, 19th 
century positivists effectively changed the content of international law 
to fit the unique interests of their sovereign states. 
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The move to positivism was however not a total divorce from 
naturalism. Instead, it emerged by first combining both natural and 
positive law. For example, the 19th century formulation of sovereignty 
was very extensive in scope, with jus publicum Europaeum—a positive 
law, recognizing the right of a sovereign state to wage war, while at the 
same time granting immunity to state conduct. Sovereign states could 
thus act even with a justa causa.117 Unlike naturalist international law 
that applied to all irrespective of cultural differences or religious 
confessions, positivist international law on the other hand created a 
sharp distinction between the civilized and the uncivilized, and 
excluded the latter from the society of nations. While highlighting a 
sharp caveat, namely that western states were sovereign and non-
European non-sovereign, positivist jurisprudence thus did not just 
legitimize the civilizing mission but also reversed the relationship 
between the colonial and colonized. It is the triumphant suppression of 
the non-European societies. Under naturalism, everybody—sovereigns 
and non-sovereigns alike were bound by natural law. Under positive 
law, the sovereign beside administering and enforcing the law could go 
even further to create other laws and manipulate existing codes.118 
Under positivist international law, the only means for the uncivilized to 
join the family of nations was to size up with the standard of 
civilization. 
 
Conclusion 
Nineteenth century international lawyers conceived European 
colonial activities in Africa and other non-European societies during the 
era in legal terms, professing that it was a humanitarian moral activism 
primarily intended to redeem these societies from their pathetic 
backward and primitive conditions into modernity thus guaranteeing 
them economic development. The immediate result of this was the 
endless process of framing a sharp difference between the backward 
“other” and the advanced Europeans, with the latter accorded an 
infinite mandate to civilize the former. My underlining contention is that 
the logic of cultural difference was cruelly construed. The positivist logic 
of excluding the uncivilized from the society of states coupled with the 
outright refusal to share any static rights, if anything is testimony of the 
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fact that the European civilizing mission in Africa was without doubt a 
self-serving project. It was as hypocritical as it was misleading. Despite 
annexing the entire African continent, European international lawyers 
throughout the colonial period routinely framed the colonial encounter 
as something about to occur as opposed to something that was already 
taking place.119 
Without the standard of civilization framed in terms of the different 
levels of development, it would have been virtually impossible to legally 
justify that natives needed to be colonized. If sovereignty was used only 
in reference to supreme authority and sovereign rights could be applied 
solely to the benefit of civilized European nations, then I find it curious 
and disturbing to think that the promise of economic development as 
articulated in the civilizing mission was not a moral pathway to 
progress but rather a strategy, a propaganda or a window-dressing to 
consolidate the hegemonic economic and political interests of 
Europeans, exploit the natives as well as subject them to the violence of 
colonization. By assigning nothing else except endless obligations to 
natives, international law almost blurred its own promises of acting to 
transform Africa from a backward to a modern society. But even 
violence is normally a two-edged sword. It may ultimately destroy him 
who wields it. Colonization cultivated an awakened mind in the 
Africans. Slowly but surely, they acquired limited education, formed 
nationalist movements and advocated for self-determination which 
paid-off though mainly through bloodshed, exactly a century after they 
were first placed under colonial captivity.  
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